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Discussions of the phenomenon of federal government suppression of the 
press during the Civil War constitute a substantial body ofliterature. Histori- 
ans have recognized that the unique stresses and strains on civil government 
induced by war resulted in extraordinary measures taken by government 
leaders to limit the speech of individuals and groups that openly criticized the 
ways in which the war was being waged. Some of these measures stretched legal 
and constitutional boundaries; others broke them outright. Historians have 
focused their attention on the thoughts and actions of President Abraham 
Lincoln in analyzing the phenomenon. In the course ofthe war, Lincoln took 
steps to crack down on speech critical of his administration and his handling 
of the war effort. However, while doing so, he attempted to reassure his crit- 
ics that the measures taken were merely temporary, meant only to carry the 
nation through the emergency. "Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy 
who deserted," he famously asked, "while I must not touch a hair of a wily 
agitator who induces him to desert?"' A few historians have taken him to task, 
pointing to his ignoring the First Amendment or his attempts to trump it with 
new powers granted by Congress. Lincoln created dangerous precedents for 
subsequent executives to follow. But most historians have been assuaged by 
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Lincoln's words and looked beyond the deeds of his administration. They have 
argued that in the North under Lincoln's leadership, no concerted, official 
policy of governmental interference with the press existed.' 
In making their arguments, historians have turned to certain well-known 
examples of press suppression. Most commonly noted are the shutting down 
of the Chicago Times in June 1863 and the closures ofthe New York World and 
New York Journal of Commerce in May 1864. One historian has deemed them 
the "most famous cases of newspaper suppression" during the war. Another 
historian has described the Chicago Times incident as the "most dramatic" 
such episode during the rebellion. Both statements are probably true. Both 
cases involved big-city newspapers with large circulations. The newspapers 
involved boasted some regional and national influence. The efforts to shut 
them down drew widespread attention." 
Frequently overshadowed in these discussions of the suppression of the 
press is the attempt by Brig. Gen. Milo S. Hascall to muzzle the Democratic 
newspapers of Indiana in the spring of 1863. Hascall's efforts are not unknown 
to historians; many have alluded to the case.4 Nonetheless, these accounts, 
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usually based on the small handful of documents published in the official 
War Department War of the Rebellion series relating to the episode, paint 
cursory, incomplete pictures of the Indiana events, omit important details, 
obscure important facts, and overlook the scale of the Union general's as- 
sault on the Democratic press. Perhaps the fact that no big city newspapers 
of large circulation were directly involved has convinced historians that the 
episode does not warrant additional attention. Indeed, all the directly affected 
Indiana newspapers were small-town papers with small circulations. But new 
research into federal and state archives, private manuscripts, and other over- 
looked sources shows important elements in play. First, the scale of Hascall's 
effort was larger than previously understood, being more widespread and 
affecting more newspapers than previously known. Furthermore, this new 
research points to understanding Hascall's effort to be a systematic assault 
on opposition voices, a policy meant to control antigovernment speech in 
Indiana. These elements of scale and impact may alter our current notion 
that federal authority failed to achieve significant control over the opposition 
press at any time during the war. 
More significantly, the episode allows an examination of two generally 
overlooked dynamics, those of federal-state relations and relations between 
state government and U.S. Army leadership during the war. Regarding the 
former, William Hesseltine's classic account of Lincoln's control over the 
Northern state governors during the war has led historians to underplay or 
dismiss the important interactions between the president, his administration, 
and the state leaders who played such an important role in the Northern 
war effort to suppress the rebellion. In Hesseltine's view, the "shrewd prairie 
lawyer" outwitted the "cajoled, conciliated, and controlled" state executives 
and came to dominate them in the course of affecting revolutionary change 
in the relationship between state and federal governments. In particular, the 
historian portrayed Lincoln as calmly reassuring an "hysterical" Governor 
War" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1968); Frank L. Klement, Dark Lanterns: Secret Political 
Societies, Conspiracies, and Treason Trials in the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. 
Press, 1984), 96; Jon Paul Dilts, "Testing Siebert's Proposition in Civil War Indiana," Journalism 
Quarterly 63 (1986): 365-68; Jeffery A. Smith, War and Press Freedom, 116-17. See also Craig D. 
Tenney, "Major General A. E. Burnside and the First Amendment: A Case Study of Civil War 
Freedom of Expression" (Ph.D. diss., Indiana University, 1977), off., a good study of the Hascall 
episode. However, Tenney failed to take into full consideration the essential role of Governor 
Oliver P. Morton. G. R. Tredway, Den~ocratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana, 
Indiana Historical Collections, vol. 48 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Bureau, 1973), 26-27, 
recognized the Hascall episode to be an official policy of press restrictions. 
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Morton whenever the Indiana executive "begged" for federal assistance. 
This theme showing Lincoln's purported domination of Morton is echoed 
by  other^.^ It might be well to reassess the relationship between the federal 
executive and the state executives during the war, especially those governors 
who shared Republican Party leadership with Lincoln, in those cases when 
the state leaders were the driving forces in setting and implementing national 
policy. Regarding the second dynamic, that of state government and Army 
relations, the historical literature is largely limited to biographical studies of 
individual generals wherein their disputes with the Northern war governors 
in the course of the war are almost parenthetically addressed, if addressed at 
all. State governors disappear from the picture. 
The Hascall effort to suppress opposition newspapers in Indiana also 
reveals that none of the leading actors expressed or displayed reservations 
about systematic efforts to control press speech. Historians have often ac- 
knowledged serious abuses of constitutionally protected liberties during the 
rebellion. However, scholars generally assert that Lincoln and his administra- 
tion showed "remarkable restraint" during a period of national crisis, and 
that the administration carefully avoided abuse of power. The examination 
of the Hascall episode will serve to shift the credit for adroit handling of a 
clumsy but serious attack on political speech by military authorities, an ad- 
junct of the federal government, from the Lincoln administration to a state 
executive driven by reasons having more to do with partisan politics than 
concerns about civil l ibertie~.~ 
The dangerously contentious 1863 session of the Democratic-controlled 
Indiana General Assembly had recently adjourned. During the session, 
Democratic Party leaders, energized and confident after significant victo- 
ries in the elections of October 1862 had succeeded in selecting two new 
United States senators, Thomas A. Hendricks and David Turpie. However, 
Republican legislators, working closely with Republican governor Oliver P. 
5. William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), 
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History 2000: Papers Presented at  the Indiana Historical Society's Grand Opening (Indianapolis: 
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Morton, fought off Democratic efforts to pass legislation to wrest wartime 
powers from the governor and vest them in a Democratic-controlled com- 
mittee. Republican legislators slipped away from the Statehouse and bolted 
the state, denying Democrats the requisite quorum. No state budget bill 
passed the legislature. The legislative session adjourned, and Democrats were 
confident that they could force Governor Morton to call a special session 
in order to fund state government. But to all parties' surprise, Morton did 
not recall the Assembly. Rather, he raised funds from the War Department, 
Republican-controlled county governments, and private bankers in New 
York. Morton's shrewd but extralegal methods allowed him to keep state 
government running without Democratic interference.' 
Indiana's Republican state government leaders relaxed briefly. In their 
private communications, Morton and his staff expressed confidence that 
events were finally under their control.' Conditions were not altogether 
rosy. Violent clashes, riots, and a growing undercurrent of resistance to the 
recently enacted federal conscription law pointed to difficulties in the state. 
But Morton banked on cooperation with amenable military commanders 
to assist him. Brig. Gen. Horatio G. Wright commanded the U.S. Army's 
Department of the Ohio, which included Indiana. The governor found he 
could get what he wanted from Wright. In March 1863, Wright appointed 
Brig. Gen. Henry B. Carrington to command the District of Indiana. Car- 
rington, a political creature ofTreasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase from the 
latter's term as governor of Ohio, had been assigned to Indiana in August 
1862 as chief recruiting and mustering officer. In that position, Carrington 
worked efficiently to organize and train Indiana's volunteer troops. He also 
accumulated troops to combat apprehended uprisings, and developed an 
effective spy network that kept Morton and the Lincoln administration 
7. On the 1863 Indiana General Assembly, see Stampp, Indiana Politics During the Civil War, 
158-85; LornaLutes Sylvester,"Oliver P. Morton and the Indiana Legislature of 1863:'in Robert 
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Centennial History of the Indiana General Assembly, 1816-1987 (Indianapolis: Select Committee 
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Mar. 6,1863, Adjutant General of Indiana Records, box L516 022627, Indiana State Archives, 
Indiana Commission on Public Records, Indianapolis (hereafter cited as Indiana State Archives). 
See also Laz Noble to Allen Hamilton, Apr. 2,1863, in the Allen Hamilton Papers, Indiana Divi- 
sion, Indiana State Library, Indianapolis; W. R. Holloway to Morton, Mar. 30,1863, and Apr. 8, 
1863, in Governor Oliver P. Morton Telegraphic Correspondence (hereafter cited as OPMTC), 
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informed of antigovernment activities in the state. The new appointment as 
district commander solidified the ties between state executive and the army. 
In sum, the officer developed a close partnership with   or ton? 
However, on March 25, Wright was relieved of his command by Maj. 
Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside on orders from the War Department. The shelved 
former commander of the Army of the Potomac, Burnside was sent west 
to departmental headquarters in Cincinnati, Ohio, with instructions from 
General-in-Chief Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck in Washington to gather 
troops to invade eastern ~ennessee." Burnside also received instructions to 
prepare to repel an invasion of Kentucky, maintain the occupation of much 
of the state, and send reinforcements from his department to Maj. Gen. 
William S. Rosecrans and Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, whose forces faced 
hostile rebel armies in Tennessee and near Vicksburg, Mississippi, respec- 
tively. To do all these things, Burnside needed troops. A dutiful officer, he 
complied with orders and quickly took steps to determine how many troops 
were available in his department. Burnside wired Indianapolis the day of his 
arrival to inquire of troop strength in Indiana. The governor was on a trip 
to the east, but his private secretary replied with an accounting of troops in 
Indianapolis. The governor, being apprised of the inquiry, wired from Har- 
risburg, Pennsylvania, to Carrington to send no force out of the state. "Not 
a man can be spared," he wrote. During the coming months, Burnside and 
Morton would continue to spar over troop levels in 1ndiana.I' 
Another issue that divided Morton and Burnside was the army com- 
mander's General Orders number 38, issued April 13, 1863, announcing 
strict military punishment for any persons who voiced opposition to the 
government in Washington and sympathy for the rebels in the South. Born 
of the army's frustration with widespread anti-war sentiments in the North, 
Burnside's order stated, among other things, that military forces would be 
employed to regulate speech and publication by Northern civilians in his 
department. "It must be distinctly understood," stated Burnside in his order, 
9. For basic information on Carrington, see Catherine McKeen,"Henry Beebee Carrington: 
A Soldier's Tale" (Ph.D. diss., State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1998). 
lo. William Marvel, Burnside (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, i991), 222-28. 
11. Burnside to Morton, Mar. 25, 1863, OPMTC, volume 16, 159, Indiana State Archives; 
Holloway to Burnside, Mar. 25, 1863, Record Group 94, General's Papers, General Ambrose 
E. Burnside Papers, box 6, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. 
(hereafter cited as Burnside Papers); Morton to Carrington, Mar. 25,1863, Carrington Family 
Papers, box 1, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library, New Haven (hereafter cited 
as Carrington Papers). 
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"that treason expressed or implied will not be tolerated." In explaining his 
policy, Burnside elsewhere affirmed his belief in the subordination of the 
military to civilian authorities; nonetheless, he believed that the military was 
"invested with a little more power [than civilian government] in suppress- 
ing anything like treason, and acts that tend to create dissention."12 General 
Orders No. 38 was a declaration of the army's intention to intervene into 
civil and political affairs in areas not under martial law. The order's publi- 
cation provoked rebukes from Democratic newspapers in the department, 
including Indiana. But Republican newspapers welcomed the measure that 
threatened dire consequences for Democratic utterance against the Lincoln 
administration. Intoned one Indiana Republican newspaper, "The furious 
storm of invective and abuse [has] ceased as if by magic." Publicly, in the 
immediate aftermath of the announcement, Morton remained silent. Efforts 
to arrange a meeting with Burnside in the following days failed.'" 
Burnside upset Morton's plans significantly yet again. Shortly after Burn- 
side assumed command in Cincinnati, the general received a broad hint from 
Halleck in Washington that Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton believed 
Carrington was not a fit officer to command in Indiana, owing his rank and 
place "entirely to political influence." Burnside wired Stanton that he would 
investigate Carrington's fitness and "relieve him if he is found deficient." 
Stanton replied that the "department has no disposition to remove General 
Carrington, or interfere with his command, unless you should find it nec- 
e~sary." '~  On April 20, in the aftermath of serious and bloody incidents in 
12. Marvel, Burnside, 231-32; for Burnside's explanation of his policy, see Cincinnati Daily 
Commercial, Apr. 20,1863. 
13. Seymour Times, Apr. 30,1863. See Burnside t o  Morton, Apr. 20,1863, and subsequent 
messages of Apr. 21, 1863, in Ambrose E. Burnside Collection, Box 1, Letterbook number 1, 
Rhode Island Historical Society, Providence (hereafter cited as Burnside Collection). 
14. Halleck to Burnside, Mar. 30, 1863, Burnside to Stanton, Apr. 6, 1863, and Stanton to 
Burnside, Apr. 6,1863, in The War ofthe Rebellion: A Compilation ofthe Oficial Records ofthe 
Union and Confederate Armies, ser. 1, vol. 23, pt. 2,193-94,216-17 (hereafter cited as OR). A few 
weeks previous to the above exchange, Robert Dale Owen,an important intermediary between 
Morton and Washington, D.C., leaders, had reported on  an interview he had with Secretary 
Stanton that casts doubt on  Halleck's assertion. Owen wrote that StantonMthinks very highly 
of Col. Carrington, and says he shall remain where he is, to aid you."Owen expressed Stanton's 
confidence in Carrington in the context of reporting his views of the Northwest Confederacy 
plot, a conspiracy planned by pro-rebel groups in the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, and 
earnestly believed by Morton, Carrington, and Owen. Wrote Owen, "Stanton fully believes in 
the plot to reconstruct leaving New England out; he feels sure it cannot succeed. In my judg- 
ment he does not fully appreciate the imminence of the danger." See Owen to Morton, Feb. 
13,1863, in Governor Oliver P. Morton Papers, Indiana State Archives. 
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Brown and Hendricks counties in Indiana, Carrington wired Burnside a 
message that was alarmist in tone and content. Burnside replied the next day 
with a patronizing telegram and revealed his ignorance of the existing close 
working relationship between Carrington and Morton. "There is no cause 
for alarm," he wrote. "Haste and indiscretion in the exercise of military force 
often creates trouble. Consult fully with Governor Morton who is thoroughly 
posted in the state affairs and will prove a good adviser." Carrington replied, 
"Rely upon my prudence. I entertain no alarm but wish to anticipate sharp 
issues." But the next day Burnside sent Carrington word that he was relieved 
of his command in Indiana immediately and was to report to headquarters 
in Cincinnati. There, Carrington later reported, Burnside told him that he 
"disapproved my policy saying-'that the radical defect was nzy use of the 
Grand Jury and civil Courts, and that the Military Commission should have 
been used only."' Brig. Gen. Milo S. Hascall was appointed in his stead.15 
News of Hascall's appointment reached Governor Morton while he was in 
Madison, Indiana, on the Ohio River. Morton immediately wired Burnside a 
curt message: "I have just learned [of] the removal of Carrington and regret 
it much. It is a blow to the Union cause in Indiana in my judgement. Will 
occasion great dissatisfaction among Union men and rejoicing among the 
rebels. Look well to your advisers in this matter, my dear General. They are 
misleading you." Morton traveled back to Indianapolis and immediately 
began to organize a campaign to retain Carrington, his right-hand military 
man. Burnside arranged to go to Indianapolis to confer with the governor 
two days after the new appointment. While there, he gave a speech reiterat- 
ing his agreement with military subordination to civil authority. Despite a 
barrage of advice from Morton and other Republican leaders in Indianapolis, 
Burnside remained firm. Carrington was reassigned to c level and.'^ 
15. Carrington to Burnside, Apr. 20,1863, box 6, Burnside Papers; Burnside to Carrington, 
Apr. 21,1863, box I, Carrington Papers; Burnside to Carrington, Apr. 22,1863, Letterbook num- 
ber 1, Burnside Collection; Burnside to Hascall, Apr. 22,1863, Letterbook number I, Burnside 
Collection. Burnside thought the troubles Carrington reported serious enough to cite them in 
a telegram to Halleck, explaining why he had not yet gone to the front: "They will in all prob- 
ability delay me here for some days.'' Burnside to Halleck, Apr. 20, 1863, Letterbook number 
1, Burnside Collection. Carrington to Salmon P. Chase, May 26,1863, in John Niven, ed., The 
Salmoi? I! Chase Papers, bolunze 4, Correspondence, Apr., 1863-1864 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State 
Univ. Press, 1997), 42-46. 
16. W. H. H. Terrell to Morton, Apr. 22,1863, and Morton to Terrell, same date, OPMTC, 
vol. lo, 218-19; Burnside to Morton, Apr. 22,1863, OPMTC, vol. 16,179, Indiana State Archives; 
Morton to Burnside, Apr. 22,1863, box 7, Burnside Papers; Indianapolis Daily Evening Gazette, 
Apr. 25,1863; Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, Apr. 25,1863. Burnside replied to Morton that he 
was "not following the advice of any one in removing Carrington-in fact no one has recom- 
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Born in New York State in 1829, Milo S. Hascall had resided in Goshen, 
Indiana, since 1847 and graduated from the United States Military Academy 
at West Point in 1852. He served briefly in the regular army before resigning 
his commission and returning to Indiana, where he was active in business, 
law, and Republican politics. At the beginning of the war, Hascall served in 
the western Virginia campaign, was commissioned Colonel ofthe q t h  Indiana 
Volunteer Infantry regiment, and appointed Brigadier General of Volunteers 
in the spring of 1862. He participated in the Shiloh and Corinth campaigns, 
as well as the "retrograde" march in pursuit of rebel General Braxton Bragg 
through Tennessee and Kentucky in Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell's army. 
Hascall distinguished himself for cool leadership in the bloody battle of Stones 
River in Tennessee in December 1862-January 1863. Often in poor health, 
Hascall was assigned by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans to superintend the 
roundup of thousands of deserters and stragglers from the Army of the Cum- 
berland in the winter of 1863. His headquarters were in ~ndiana~olis." 
General Hascall took command of the District of Indiana in Indianapolis 
immediately on April 22,1863, and walked into the middle of a serious power 
struggle. Morton and Burnside vied for the upper hand in how to deal with 
antiwar sentiment and resistance to government in Indiana. Hascall enjoyed 
the confidence of his commander, who appreciated his fighting record. But 
his relations with Governor Morton were poor. The governor placed no 
trust in the young general. First, Hascall was ignorant of Carrington's spy 
organization, an important weapon in the governor's arsenal in controlling 
mended it."This statement ignored Halleck's original suggestion to Burnside. See Burnside to 
Morton, Apr. 22,1863, Letterbook number I, Burnside Collection. 
17. For information on Milo Hascall, see Stephen E. Towne, ed.,"West Point Letters of Milo 
S. Hascall, 1848-1850," bzdiana Magazine of History 90 (Sept. 1994): 278-94. General Rosecrans 
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during this inclement season,"and that Hascall was under orders to "consult with you and oth- 
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River. According to this account, Rosecrans failed to inspire confidence in the army owing 
to his Roman Catholic faith and possessing an inflated ego. Hascall states that he applied 
for a transfer out of Rosecrans's command due to his lack of confidence in his leadership. 
Expecting to be placed under arrest for insubordination, Hascall was instead sent north with 
the comment from his commander that he could not be spared. See Milo S. Hascall, Personal 
Recollections a i d  Experiences Concerning the Battle o f  Stone River (Goshen, Ind., 1899), qff. 
Hascall was officially transferred to Burnside's Department of the Ohio on  May 12,1863. See 
OR, ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 2,326. 
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the antiwar Democracy. Second, unlike Carrington, the new commander 
followed orders promptly in dispatching troops in Indiana to the front. 
Third, Hascall agreed with Burnside in the efficacy of military intervention 
to quell civil disturbance and civilian resistance to the war effort. On April 
25, Morton successfully persuaded the generals not to send a military expedi- 
tion to Brown County, instead sending a bipartisan deputation to investigate 
and report on the situation. In Morton's view, the situation was too peril- 
ous to leave to injudicious military officers. He again requested the return 
of General Carrington to Indianapolis: "He is in possession of information 
important for me to have." Morton pressed further for Carrington's prompt 
return, writing again to Burnside that he was planning to go to Washington 
but could not go until Carrington arrived. "I shall feel much embarrassed in 
leaving the state with a new man here." To a Republican colleague, he wrote, 
"Carrington has been removed, and a new man appointed who knows but 
little about the ~ t a t e . " ' ~  
On Saturday, April 25, three days after his appointment, Hascall issued 
his own proclamation addressing political speech and publication, General 
Orders No. 9. His order served as an amplification of General Orders No. 
38, specially tailored for Indiana. The general was charged, he wrote, with 
enforcing General Orders No. 38 in the state. He noted that "unmistakable 
evidence reached him that the provisions of this Order have been and are 
being, violated in various parts of the State." Newspapers and public speakers 
had "led astray" "well meaning men" to violate the order. They "will there- 
fore be held to the most rigid accountability. . . . All newspapers and public 
speakers that counsel or encourage resistance to the Conscription Act, or any 
other law of Congress passed as a war measure, or that endeavor to bring the 
war policy of the Government into disrepute, will be considered as having 
violated the Order above alluded to, and treated accordingly." Concluding, 
Hascall added, "The country will have to be saved or lost during the time 
this Administration remains in power, and therefore he who is factiously and 
actively opposed to the war policy of the Administration, is as much opposed 
to his Government." The order appeared in Indianapolis' chief Republican 
18. See Laz Noble to Hascall, Apr. 23,1863, Adjutant General's Letterbook number 2, page 
79, Adjutant General of Indiana Records, Indiana State Archives; two telegrams of Morton to 
Burnside, Apr. 25, 1863, box 7, Burnside Papers; Morton to Jesse J. Brown, Apr. 29,1863, OP- 
MTC, vol. lo, 234, Indiana State Archives; Hascall to Burnside, Apr. 26,1863, box 7, Burnside 
Papers. Burnside allowed Carrington to return to Indianapolis temporarily. The Indianapolis 
Daily Journal of Apr. 28,1863, reported that "General Carrington is also in the city on military 
business connected with the affairs of Indiana." 
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newspaper, the primary organ of the party in the state, on the following 
Monday, April 27. That day Hascall wrote to his superior in Cincinnati that 
"I have issued a General order today which I think will do good and will meet 
your hearty approbation. I think it is practical and can be carried out. . . . I 
will send you tomorrow a copy of the order I have issued and would like to 
know whether it meets your approbation." Burnside wired him on April 29 
that his letter with the text of the order was "very sa t i s fac t~r~ ." '~  
As General Orders No. 9 began to disseminate around the state and began 
to appear in both Republican and Democratic newspapers, strong howls of 
protest emitted from Democratic speakers and the Democratic press. Examin- 
ing General Orders No. 38 and General Orders No. 9 together, many editors 
wondered what might be considered treasonable under the broad heading of 
bringing the war policy of the Lincoln administration into disrepute. "We are 
unable to say exactly what this language means," wrote the Goshen Democrat, 
the Democratic newspaper in Hascall's hometown. Others wondered what 
! Burnside and Hascall meant by "implied treason." The Indianapolis Daily 
State Sentinel, the organ of the state Democratic party, noted, "There is no 
such crime as 'implied treason."' The editor of the Evansville Weekly Gazette 
remarked that "it now seems that it is [as] dangerous [to voice doubts about 
administration policies] as it is impossible for anybody to determine what a 
military officer may choose to embrace under the name of 'implied treason.'. . . 
We suggest that some military lawyer. . . should spare the time. . . to give us 
a few instances of 'implied trea~on."'~' 
Hascall acted promptly to arrest Democratic newspaper editors and stop 
their presses to demonstrate the meaning ofhis military order. The first editor 
arrested was Daniel E. VanValkenburgh of the Plymouth Weekly Democrat. 
VanValkenburgh had ridiculed General Orders No. 9 at length in his edi- 
tion of April 30. Noting its "imperial style," the editor condemned "its total 
disregard of civil law and the rights of citizens in loyal districts." He launched 
into a barrage of personal abuse of Hascall, calling him a "country politician" 
and braying donkey "who has no more rightful authority over the people of 
Indiana than our town marshal." Having been sent a copy of the newspaper 
by the editor of Plymouth's Republican newspaper, Hascall dispatched troops 
to the northern Indiana town on May 4. The offending editor was arrested, 
19. Indianapolis Dailylournal, Apr. 27,1863; Hascall to Burnside, Apr. 27,1863, box 7, Burnside 
Papers; Burnside to Hascall, Apr. 29,1863, Letterbook number 1, Burnside Collection. 
20. Goshen Democrat, Apr. 29,1863; Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, Apr. 14,1863; Evansville 
Weekly Gazette, Apr. 25,1863. 
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carried back to Indianapolis, held in the prisoner-of-war camp, and then sent 
to Burnside in Cincinnati. There the general extracted an oath of allegiance 
from the editor and released him on a promise "to conduct his paper on 
proper principles." The newspaper's publication was suppressed for one week 
and only a half-sheet edition appeared the following week.21 
Other arrests of Democratic newspaper editors who had sneered at 
Hascall's order occurred in the following days. Rufus Magee, editor of the 
Pulaski Democrat in Winamac, was arrested and his newspaper suspended 
for two weeks. Hascall permitted Magee to issue a half-sheet to explain why 
the paper was suppressed: "an alleged disobedience of Order number 9." The 
Columbia City News was shut down and its editor, Engelbert Zimmerman, 
was ordered to Indianapolis to answer for his offense. Hascall notified the 
South Bend Forum either to retract its boasts to violate his order or suspend 
publication. The editors of the Democratic newspaper, W. H. and Ariel 
Drapier, chose the latter course and closed the newspaper, refusing to retract 
their ~ ta te rnents .~~  
Hascall notified still other Indiana Democratic newspapers to change their 
tone or face suspension. These newspapers included the Starke County Press, 
the Bluffton Banner, the Blackford Democrat, the Warsaw Union, and the 
Franklin Weekly Democratic Herald, all but the last paper located in northern 
Indiana. Records do not show if these newspapers' editors were arrested or 
their publication suspended.23 
21. Plymouth Weekly Democrat, Apr. 30,1863; Hascall to Editor of Plytnouth M'eekb Democrat, 
May 4,1863, box 7, Burnside Papers; Burnside to Hascall, May 6,1863, in Record Group 393, 
Records of U.S. Army Continental Commands, Part 111, entry 223 (Correspondence Between 
General Burnside Commanding Department of the Ohio and General Hascall of the District 
of Indiana), vol. 87ND, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.; 
Plymouth Marshall County Republican, May 21,1863; Plyrnotrtli Weekly Democrat, May 14,1863. 
For VanValkenburgh's own account of his arrest, see Daniel McDonald, A Twentieth Century 
History of Marshall Cotrnty Indiana (Chicago: Lewis Publishing Company, 1908), 1292. 
22. Logansport Democratic Pharos, June 3, 1863, quoting the Ptllaski Democrat; Columbia 
City News, May 26, 1863; South Beid Forrrni, May 2, 9, and 23, 1863. See also OR, ser. 2, vol. 
5,723-26. The Republican newspapers of South Bend suggested the Drapiers shut down the 
Forum for "pecuniary reasons," and found the Hascall order a convenient excuse. See the 
Mishawaka Enterprise, May 23,1863, and the St. Joseph Valley Register, May 21,1863. The Dra- 
piers at the time compiled and published by contract with the Indiana General Assembly the 
Brevier Legislative Reports. 
23. Columbia City News, June 2 and 9, 1863; Huntington Denzocrat, May 28 and June 4, 
1863; Fort Wayne Dawson's Daily Times and Unioiz, May 7,1863. The Huntington Democrat of 
May 28, 1863, listed five newspapers as suppressed: the Columbia City News, the South Bend 
Forum, the Winamac Pulaski Democrat, the Plymouth Weekly Democrat, and the "Johnson 
County Democrat" [sic, the Franklin Weekly Democratic Herald]. It listed three newspapers 
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In another instance, popular action thwarted Hascall's attempt to arrest 
the editors of a Democratic newspaper. On the night of May 15, he dispatched 
a squad of troops to the northern Indiana town of Huntington, where the 
particularly vociferous antiwar Huntington Democrat was published by 
Samuel F. Winter and William C. Kocher. However, a crowd of men armed 
with revolvers and clubs estimated to be between fifty and two hundred 
strong prevented the arrests.24 
Hascall's policy of arrests and threats of arrest of editors and suspension 
ofpublication of Democratic newspapers achieved the intended effect. Many 
Democratic newspapers in the state appear to have been intimidated by the 
military policy. Several outspoken editors refrained from their normallyvitri- 
olic condemnation of federal war policy and measured their words carefully. 
James Elder of the Richmond Jeflersonian cautioned his readers "to say noth- 
ing of a provocative or offensive nature, and to do nothing that contravenes 
the laws and regulations of the constituted authorities." The Owen County 
Journal in Spencer wrote that "we are sure our readers will pardon us if, until 
further notice [italics in original], we are silent upon the great issues which 
agitate the public mind. . . . [I]t becomes Democrats to be silent." Observed 
the Miami County Sentinel in Peru, "We forebear to comment further upon 
[the arrest of Ohio Democratic leader Clement L. Vallandigham]. Indeed, we 
think an observance of 'Military Order No. 9' is necessary upon this point, in 
order to maintain the peace and good order ofsociety. Concluded the Sullivan 
Democrat, "However galling this may be we have no alternative but to qui- 
etly submit."25 Many public speakers also trod carefully. The statewide mass 
meeting of Democrats held in Indianapolis on May 20, attended by several 
thousand party faithful, produced a few fierce antiwar, anti-administration 
speeches, but the general tenor of criticism was pale. In preparation for the 
event, Hascall posted all his available infantry, several squadrons of cavalry, 
as threatened with suspension if no retraction was made: the Blufion Banner, the Blackford 
Democrat, and the Warsaw Union. See also OR, ser. 2, vol. 5,723-26. For a prosopographical 
analysis of Indiana Democratic newspaper editors who were arrested, o r  whose newspapers 
were suppressed or attacked during the Civil War, see Bruce Bigelow and Stephen E. Towne, 
"Democratic Opposition to the Lincoln Administration in Indiana: The Polls and the Press," 
Journal of the Indiana Academy ofthe Social Sciences 5 (2001): 71-82. 
24. Hiintington Democrat, May 28,1863, and Huntington Indiana Herald, June 10,1863. The 
Democratic paper estimated the crowd at two hundred; the Republican newspaper put the 
crowd at fifty. 
25. Richmond JefFrsonian, May 7, 1863; Sullivan Democrat, May 7, 1863, also quoting the 
Owen Cotlnty Jo~lrnal; Miami County Sentinel, May 21,1863. 
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and unlimbered artillery at strategic points in the city, and at the same time 
surrounded the meeting participants with a show of military force. Arrests 
for carrying concealed weapons and cheering Jefferson Davis were made by 
troops. Other troops threatened speakers on the stands, including U.S. sena- 
tor Thomas A. Hendricks. When departing Democrats fired their pistols and 
revolvers in the air from their trains, Hascall ordered troops to stop them, 
surrounded the trains, and disarmed the many carrying firearms. No doubt 
the show of military force muted much fiery rhet~ric. '~ 
Democrats fought back against Hascall's order as best they could. How- 
ever, instead of direct confrontation with military authority, Democrats 
employed indirect methods. Joseph K. Edgerton, the newly elected Demo- 
cratic U.S. representative from Fort Wayne in northern Indiana, prodded 
the general into a war of words. On May 2, one week after General Orders 
No. 9 appeared, the congressman wrote a private letter to Hascall, asking 
the general to clarify the meaning of the order. "You will," he wrote, "of 
course, admit that if the people are to obey your order, it is important they 
should know its exact scope and design." Edgerton asked the meaning ofthe 
phrases "endeavor to bring the war policy ofthe Government into disrepute," 
"actively opposed to the war policy of the Administration," and "opposed 
to the Government." Hascall answered Edgerton in a long lecture that he 
submitted to the Indianapolis Daily Journal for publication. In it, he laid 
out his views on proper obedience to authority. Hascall outlined the federal 
government's war policy, including the tax, confiscation, and conscription 
acts and the Emancipation Proclamation. Both Congress and the president 
had formulated them after long and mature deliberation. "Possibly, they are 
not the wisest and best that could have been enacted," wrote the general. 
"That, however, is a matter which does not now concern either of us. Enough 
for us to know, that they have been agreed upon" by the lawful government. 
Allowing newspapers and speakers to criticize these policies will only "divide 
and distract" the Northern people, "and thus give material 'aid and comfort' 
to our enemies." Hascall reiterated his belief that the rebellion had to be 
"either established or crushed" within the time of Lincoln's term in office. 
Opposition to the Lincoln administration equaled opposition to the U.S. 
government. The war would end soon, he opined, but some persons would 
try to prolong the war and obstruct the administration's suppression ofthe 
rebellion to allow "another Administration [to] get the credit of settling it." 
26. Indiaizapoli~ Daily Eveniilg Gazette, May 20 and 21,1863. See three telegrams from Hascall 
to Burnside, May 20, 1863, box 7, Burnside Papers. 
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He would strike at the leaders ofdivisiveness and obstructionism as the source 
of the problem. "As well I might establish a number of small pox hospitals 
in the heart of the city, and then punish the people for being infected with 
that loathsome disease, as to allow newspapers and public speakers to belch 
forth their disloyal and treasonable doctrine." "To kill the serpent speedily," 
he wrote, "it must be hit on the head."27 
Edgerton prepared a bold reply that, published in Democratic newspapers 
throughout the state and elsewhere, served both as a Democratic manifesto 
and a call to arms. General Orders No. 9, he wrote, "is not entitled to respect 
and obedience." The order was not the product of Indiana's government, 
"to whom belongs . . . the control and conduct of the civil affairs of the 
state." Rebellion did not exist in the state, and government continued intact. 
"Freemen" enjoyed the inalienable rights of free speech, a free press, and 
free courts, and would not suffer to be enslaved. The "merest tyro" knows 
that this military order "cannot stand the ordeal of discussion, judicial 
investigation or attempted execution." Though the people may submit to 
the order presently, "even the deluded people who may now approve and 
applaud your despotic acts . . . will awake" and on the "day of retribution 
and justice" rebuild and "re-enthrone" law and constitutional government. 
Edgerton proclaimed his desire to suppress the rebellion "by all constitutional 
means," and his willingness to support the administration's war policy to 
the extent he believed it warranted support. But he defiantly enunciated his 
opposition to Lincoln administration policies that he saw as "vindictive and 
unconstitutional. . . toward the States in rebellion." These policies, such as 
the confiscation acts and the Emancipation Proclamation, would not sup- 
press the rebellion or restore the Union. Thus, he could not support the 
Lincoln administration, and he would take actives steps to depose Lincoln 
via the ballot box. In conclusion, Edgerton wondered: 
Where is Oliver P. Morton, the constitutional civil Governor of Indiana, 
that he does not at once speak and rebuke your claim to exercise authority 
and do acts, that you cannot exercise or do, without a clear violation of the 
Constitution and laws of the State of Indiana, and ofthe United States, and 
without degrading him to a mere cipher and pageant in the State? I would 
be glad to know that Gov. Morton can answer this question as becomes 
the dignity and freedom of the State whose Chief Magistrate he is.2" 
27. Indianapolis Daiij>]ournal, May 6,1863. 
28. Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, May 15,1863. 
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Edgerton knew that the best means available to rein in the military au- 
thorities was not Democratic complaining but Republican Governor Morton, 
whose energetically pro-war, pro-administration stance was universally ac- 
k r ~ o w l e d ~ e d . ~ ~  Morton publicly remained quiet on the issue of General Orders 
Nos. 38 and 9. However, privately he was seething. Burnside's and Hascall's 
orders, rather than squelching Democratic opposition, were having the op- 
posite effect of reinvigorating the antiwar, anti-Lincoln party in Indiana that 
he had himself quelled at the end of the General Assembly. While the orders 
intimidated antiwar expression temporarily, arrests of prominent Democrats 
and the orders themselves mobilized fellow party members. Leading Democrats 
such as U.S. Representative Daniel W. Voorhees, former U.S. Senator Graham 
N. Fitch, Senator Thomas A. Hendricks, and others heaped odium on the or- 
ders. Clement L. Vallandigham, the midwestern leader of antiwar sentiment, 
particularly attacked General Orders No. 9 in the speech that provoked his 
arrest by order of Burnside. National attention focused on Hascall's order.30 
Morton would tolerate it no further. On May 15, the day Edgerton's reply 
appeared in the newspapers, he met with Hascall. The following day Hascall 
reported to Burnside that the governor "told me plainly that he did not con- 
sider your order 38 practical, and he thought it could not be carried out-that 
efforts to enforce it might as well be given up in his opinion, and that it was 
creating immense difficulty all over the Country." Morton also told the 
general that the arrest and trial of Vallandigham was "entirely unwarranted 
29. It is not impossible that Edgerton and other Democrats may have been aware of Morton's 
frustration with the military authorities in Indiana. Morton's staff had received assurances 
from an influential Fort Wayne War Democrat that Edgerton would not oppose the war effort 
in Congress. Fort Wayne banker Allen Hamilton reported, "I think from conversations I had 
with Mr. Edgerton our member of Congress that he will urge submission to the laws and 
prosecution of the war." See Allen Hamilton to Laz Noble, Apr. 7, 1863, Adjutant General of 
Indiana Records, Box A4017 024596, folder 12, Indiana State Archives. Likewise, Edgerton may 
have been alerted to Morton's opposition to Burnside's and Hascall's policy. 
30. For information on Vallandigham's speech at Mt. Vernon, Ohio, that provoked his ar- 
rest, see Frank L. Klement, The Limits of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham and the Civil War 
(Lexington: Univ. Press of Kentucky, 1970)) 151ff. Hascall wrote a private letter to the editor 
of the New York Express on May 5,1863, rebuking him for his damning comments regarding 
General Orders No. 9. Hascall's note was published in the Express and reprinted in the New York 
Times. See OR, ser. 2, vol. 5,723-26. Burnside was alerted to the exchange and queried Hascall 
about the matter. Hascall explained that the letter he wrote was not intended for publication. 
"I know it is in bad taste to pay much attention to newspaper comments, and accordingly I 
have not done so except in one or two instances, in aggravated cases, and when some such 
reason as their being members of congress seemed to justify such course." Burnside to Hascall, 
May 17,1863, Letterbook number 1, Burnside Collection, and telegram and letter of Hascall to 
Burnside, May 18,1863, box 7, Burnside Papers. 
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and could not be justified." Only "attachees" of the military could be tried 
by military commission. "This," fretted Hascall, "is very singular ground to 
occupy. It is admitting away our whole case. I acknowledge that I am not a 
little embarrassed by this state ofthings[.] I think all could have been managed 
very well after the first effervescence was over but for this unexpected 'fire in 
the rear."' "The trouble seems to be," he continued, "that you issued order 38 
without consulting him and removed Genl Carrington in a similar manner. 
He [doesn't] seem to find so much fault with either act as he does with the 
fact that he was not consulted." Hascall reminded his superior of Morton's 
previous record with generals who displeased him: "General Buell, incurred 
his displeasure in a similar manner when he first took command of the Dept 
and the Govr never, ceased in his exertions against him till he was removed 
and the court organized as it was against him. These facts and surmises I have 
considered it important to you to know. Forewarned is f~rearmed."~'  
Hascall was correct to warn Burnside. The following day, Sunday, May 17, 
Morton visited Indianapolis banker Calvin Fletcher at his home and declared 
his intention to depose both generals. Fletcher recorded in his diary: 
Govr. Morton called on me to advise &to explain his position in relation 
to Genl. Hascall & Burnsides new orders. He views the former a mere 4th 
rate man & Burnsides not strong but weak in his administrative ability 
Condemns the removal of Genl. Carrington & the orders restricting the 
press etc That Hascall is incompetent to carry out reasonable orders-a 
real failure that these orders ca'nt consistently be resinded but only way 
to get rid of them is to remove Burnsides-that he goes to Washington 
this week-that he has not the ear of Hallack but of President Lincoln 
who is not e f f i ~ i e n t . ~ ~  
Morton campaigned privately to remove both Burnside and Hascall. He 
enlisted the support and assistance of at least one important leader close to 
Lincoln to this end. United States Supreme Court Justice David Davis, a friend 
of the president's and his campaign manager in 1860, was in Indianapolis 
in May 1863, serving on the federal circuit court bench. He recognized the 
31. Hascall to Burnside, May 16, 1863, box 7, Burnside Papers. For details on the dispute 
between Morton and Gen. Don Carlos Buell, see Stephen D. Engle, Don Carlos Buell: Most 
PromisingofAll (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1999), 314-20. 
32. Entry of May 17,1863, in Gayle Thornbrough and Paula Corpuz, eds., The Diary of Calvin 
Fletcher, Volume VIII, 1863-1864 (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1981), 139. 
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dangers of the generals' methods. His instructions to the federal grand jury 
in a case concerning disloyalty and disloyal practices, amounting to a lecture 
on the legal definition of treason, contrasted starkly with Hascall's views. The 
contrast was noted by the state's Democratic press. Davis also telegraphed 
Secretary Stanton, stating, "I have been for several weeks, and am, perfectly 
satisfied that the immediate removal of General Hascall is demanded by the 
honor and interests of the ~overnment."~"n addition, the Indianapolis Daily 
State Sentinel, the organ of the state Democratic party, noted that Governor 
Morton opposed the military policy of "arbitrary arrests." This story, leaked 
by the governor's office to the opposition press, put pressure on the generals. 
Morton had privately voiced his opposition to military interference in civil 
matters in his state. Now he had gone 
Morton, always energetic, was remarkably active during this period, 
making several trips to Washington from early May to early June 1863 in 
the span of about five weeks. There he pressed administration and military 
leaders to remove Burnside and Hascall. Whether Morton met with President 
Lincoln to discuss the matter is not known. His results were mixed. Burnside 
remained in his post. Even when his handling of the Vallandigham arrest 
and trial proved highly troublesome, administration leaders were loath to 
face again the political embarrassment of removing yet another high-rank- 
ing general from command. However, Morton's efforts bore some fruit. 
Washington leaders began to put pressure on Burnside to deal with Hascall, 
who also irritated Governor Morton. In his inimitably and ambiguously sug- 
gestive fashion, General Henry Halleck wrote to Burnside on May 20 that 
Secretary Stanton disliked the practice of employing district commanders 
in the western states of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. "Moreover," he wrote, 
33. Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, May 8 and 11,1863; Davis to Stanton, May 27,1863, OR, 
ser. I, vol. 23, pt. 2, 369. Morton also sent a separate telegram from Indianapolis to Stanton at 
the same time as Davis,"il pm,"suggesting a concerted effort by the two men. See Morton to 
Stanton, ibid. 
34. Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel, May 25,1863. On Apr. 29,1863, a prominent Demo- 
cratic physician in Indianapolis was arrested by military authorities for alleged treasonable 
correspondence and encouraging desertions. Nicholas J. Dorsey had previously volunteered to 
assist Governor Morton's efforts to provide medical aid to Indiana troops in the field. Morton 
intervened in his case with Burnside and obtained his release. See Holloway to Burnside, May 
7,1863, OPMTC, vol. 16,186, and Burnside to Holloway, May 7,1863, ibid., 187, Indiana State 
Archives. See also Morton to Gen. Jeremiah T. Boyle, May 2,1863, Morton Papers, Letterbook 
number 2,742-43, Indiana State Archives, and Burnside to Hascall, May 7,1863, RG 393, entry 
223, National Archives. Democratic newspapers in the state reported that Morton was instru- 
mental in Dorsey's release. 
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without naming names, "it seems difficult to find military commanders of 
sufficient judgment and discretion to avoid conflicts with the civil authori- 
ties." Military officers should not assume powers that are not theirs. "All this 
does much harm, by inciting party passions and political an im~si t ies . "~~ 
In an ill-timed gesture of cooperation, On May 26 Hascall wrote to Morton 
that notwithstanding his known dislike for "arbitrary arrests," the general "had 
some cases on hand now requiring in my judgment this kind ofaction."" The 
next day Morton telegraphed Stanton, "General Hascall is still in command 
here. I hope you will see that your order for his removal is executed at once. 
It is important."" It is clear, then, that the governor had previously secured a 
promise from the Secretary of War to have Hascall sacked. However, Stanton 
had delayed action. On May 30, Morton addressed a long letter to President 
Lincoln, laying out his objections to Burnside and his General Orders No. 
38, paying exclusive attention to the problems caused by military arrests. 
The order has "wholly failed to accomplish the purpose for which it was in- 
tended." Rather, it was "intensifymg the hatred" that Democrats felt toward 
the administration. "If arrests are to be made," he wrote, "they should be 
made by the highest authority on deliberation. . . . Temporary commanders 
of Departments, who are here today and gone tomorrow, some of whom are 
very poor politicians," should not be vested with such authority. "General 
Burnside's Order," he continued, "supersedes civil authority in Ohio, Indiana 
and Illinois, and although it was not issued with your knowledge, or by your 
authority, yet your subsequent silence gives it your ratification before the 
public." "My own opinion is," he concluded, "that the preservation of the 
peace and loyalty" of Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois should be "left with the State 
authorities to be aided and supported by Federal power when nece~sary."~~ 
Finally, in a letter dated June I, 1863, Stanton wrote to Burnside that 
President Lincoln had been apprised of Hascall's General Orders No. 9 and 
letters in the press. Stanton encouraged the general to consider 
Whether it would not be better to withdraw General Hascall from that com- 
mand. Whatever dissatisfaction there may exist in the State of Indiana. . . 
35. Halleck to Burnside, May 20,1863, box 7, Burnside Papers, also published in OR, ser. 
2, vol. 5,664-65. For Burnside's relations with Washington in May 1863, see Marvel, Btrrnside, 
237-40, 
36. Hascall to Morton, May 26,1863, Morton Papers, Indiana State Archives. 
37. Morton to Stanton, May 27,1863, OR, ser. 1, vol. 23, pt. 2,369. 
38. Morton to Lincoln, May 30,1863, Robert Todd Lincoln Collection, microfilm roll number 
53, Library of Congress, MTashington, D.C. 
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is liable to be increased by the presence of an indiscreet military officer, 
who will unnecessarily interfere with the political condition of the State 
and produce irritation by assuming military powers not essential to the 
preservation of the public peace. Great care is to be exercised in those 
States not to excite the apprehensions of the State Executives who are loyal 
and diligent in maintaining the authority of the Government. 
According to Stanton, Lincoln wished to maintain a "good understanding" 
with Governor Morton and the other governors in the department; the presi- 
dent thought it best to leave the running of the states to their governors, who 
knew the "temper of the people" and their "natural aversion" to unnecessary 
military powers. The president did not wish to "restrict you in the powers" 
other military commanders exercised, but "only to make such suggestions 
as are thought to be expedient for the public service. . . . The proper limit 
of military power in such cases is at [the governors'] request to aid and not 
supersede the State authority." The secretary enclosed newspaper clippings 
of Hascall's exchanges with newspaper editors to illustrate the general's in- 
discretions. Two days later, on June 3, Stanton wired Morton, "Instructions 
have this day been forwarded by mail to Gen. Burnside which will, I think, 
remove all complaint, and accomplish your wishes."39 
Burnside was at that moment embroiled in another newspaper con- 
troversy. On June 1, 1863, Burnside ordered military forces in Chicago to 
shut down the Chicago Times, a leading antiwar, anti-Lincoln journal. The 
order provoked massive protest in Chicago, and a group of leading Illinois 
Democrats and Republicans together petitioned President Lincoln to order 
Burnside to revoke his order. Lincoln did so. However, another group of 
influential Republicans in Illinois protested the president's lifting the ban 
on the newspaper. Lincoln, in a show of political indecision, changed di- 
39. Stanton to Burnside, June 1,1863, OR, ser, 2, vol. 5,723-26; Stanton to Morton, June 3, 
1863, OPMTC, vol. 16, 209, Indiana State Archives. It is likely that the newspaper references 
supplied by Stanton to Burnside had been provided by Governor Morton. It is also clear that 
Morton knew that Lincoln and the cabinet disapproved of Burnside's policy of military arrests 
before the general learned of it. O n  May 29,1863, Burnside wired Lincoln that "a messenger from 
Governor Morton came to me this morning in reference to the arrest by the military authori- 
ties of a citizen of Indiana. 1 understood from him that my action . . . was not approved by a 
single member of your Cabinet."See Burnside to Lincoln, May 29,1863, Letterbook z, Burnside 
Collection, and Morton to Burnside, May 28,1863, box 8, Burnside Papers. The Indiana citizen 
in question was State Senator Alexander J. Douglas, a Democratic legislator from northern 
Indiana, who was arrested in Ohio by military authority after making speeches denouncing 
General Orders No. 38. The arrest stirred considerable opposition in Indiana. 
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rections and on June 4 Stanton sent a message to Burnside to let the ban 
on publication stand if he had not already lifted it. But Burnside had acted 
promptly on the first order from the president and had lifted his ban. He 
wired to Stanton, "I am very much embarrassed and beg to ask for specific 
instructions in such  case^."“^ 
Burnside's embarrassment continued when he received Stanton's letter of 
June 1 (sent June 3) regarding Hascall. However, he followed the secretary's 
suggestion. On June 5, he telegraphed the Indiana general stating that his district 
was reorganized to include the state ofMichigan, and that Brig. Gen. Orlando 
B. Willcox was relieving him of its command. "AUow me to thank you," he 
continued, in a personal tone unlike that he took when he dismissed Carrington 
only six weeks earlier, "for your hearty co-operation and very efficient service 
and aid in carrying out the policy adopted in this department." Hascall in reply 
proposed an order rescinding his General Orders No. 9 "and disavowing all 
right to take action on account of disloyal practices." He continued sadly, "It 
seems to me that after the president's action in the Chicago Times matter no 
other course is left us." On Willcox's arrival on June 8, Hascall turned over his 
command and rescinded his General Orders No. 9. Granted thirty days leave 
by a grateful Burnside, the general took his leave of ~ndiana~ol i s .~ '  
General Hascall's brief tenure in Indiana resulted in more newspapers 
being suppressed or threatened with suppression than has previously been 
understood. All told, at least ten Indiana newspapers faced official military 
sanctions as a result of General Orders No. 9. This represents 13 percent of 
40. See Tenney,"To Suppress or  Not to Suppress," 253-59. Unfortunately, since 1981, when 
Tenney's important article appeared, many historians have either overlooked or ignored 
Lincoln's flip-flop regarding the suppression of the Chicago Times, preferring to see Lincoln 
acting to lift press restrictions rather than reimpose them for purposes of political expedi- 
ency. Historians who have omitted Tenney's analysis are, for example, David Donald, Lincoln 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 21; David E. Long, TheJewel ofLiberty: Abraham Lincoln's 
Re-election and the End ofSlavery (Mechanicsburg, Pa.: Stackpole Press, 1994), 84-85; Marvel, 
Burnside, 245-46; Huntzicker, The Poptrlar Press, 127-28; John Tebbel and Sarah Miles Watts, 
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for Freedom of Expression in American History (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, zooo), 316; 
Mark E. Neely Jr., The Union Divided: Party Conflict in the Civil War North (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard Univ. Press, zooz), 98; Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in kvartime from 
the Sedition Act of1798 to the War on Terrorlsni (NexvYork: IV. W. Norton, zooq), 118. 
41. Burnside to Hascall, June 5,1863, Letterbook number 2, Burnside Collection; Hascall to 
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the approximately seventy-five Democratic newspapers published in Indiana 
in 1863.~' In addition, antiwar, anti-administration utterance by the press 
was markedly dampened in early May 1863, as a number of newspaper edi- 
tors toned down their criticisms in light of Hascall's actions against fellow 
Democratic newspapers and editors. However, this self-censorship appears 
to have lasted only briefly; the suppression of newspapers and the arrest of 
Democrats for various alleged offenses energized the party and its organs. It 
is important to note that Hascall appears to have perceived the reinvigora- 
tion of Democratic antiwar rhetoric and contemplated additional actions to 
control Democratic opposition. In his May 16 letter to Burnside, in which he 
reported Governor Morton's displeasure with his and Burnside's actions, he 
expressed his plan to renew the assertion of military authority in the state. "I 
have made up my mind," he wrote, "to keep things as quiet as possible till 
after the mass meeting here on the 20th and then take hold again."43 What I 
he meant by to "take hold" undoubtedly refers to resuming his systematic 
campaign against anti-administration utterance. Thus, Hascall contem- 
plated resuming his policy of arrests of editors and the suppression of their 
newspapers. His letter to Morton of May 26 further points to his intention 
to use military power to make "arbitrary arrests." 
For reasons unexplained, Hascall did not resume the arrests of Democratic 
editors after the Democratic mass meeting in Indianapolis on May 20. Re- 
cords do not indicate that Burnside either encouraged Hascall or suggested 
restraint regarding "talung hold" again. Indeed, from the Chicago Times case 
we know that Burnside continued to employ placing restrictions on press 
utterance. Other cases of plans to resort to press restrictions in his depart- 
ment existed as Burnside viewed military restrictions on newspaper 
and political speech within the purview of his responsibility to manage the 
U.S. Army and maintain order in his department. Shortly after the double 
embarrassments of having to rescind his Chicago Times order and relieving 
42. It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of newspapers in circulation at the time. 
Copies of many titles are no  longer extant, and for many other titles complete runs of issues 
d o  not exist. Information on  many publications must often be gleaned from surviving cop- 
ies of rival newspapers. For general information on Indiana newspapers, see John W. Miller, 
Indiana Newspaper Bibliography (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1982). In the figure 
of seventy-five Democratic newspapers published in 1863, I include eight Union Democrat or 
War Democrat titles. These newspapers supported the war effort. 
43. Hascall to Burnside, May 16,1863, box 7, Burnside Papers. 
44. See Burnside to Gen. Orlando B. Willcox, Apr. 19,1863, Burnside to Gen. Jeremiah T. 
Boyle, Apr. 27,1863, and Burnside to Gen. John S. Mason, May 13,1863, Letterbook number I, 
Burnside Collection. 
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Hascall under pressure, Burnside vented his anger in a personal letter to a 
friend. The general lamented that "treason is rife in this department." Unfet- 
tered newspapers and public speakers surpassed secret political societies in 
their threat to order. "The civil law is too slow," and cannot combat these 
dangerous elements. "Arbitrary power" was needed to combat them. "No 
general," he wrote, "can be efficient without such power."45 Burnside sup- 
ported the use of military force to suppress what he viewed as dangerous 
speech. But he was frustrated by the success of Governor Morton in pres- 
suring the Lincoln administration to control the Army. 
While the issues of freedom of the press and freedom of speech resound in 
our thoughts, we should not understand the Hascall episode to be a victory for 
the proponents of free-speech rights. Concerns for unrestricted political utter- 
ance were far from the forefront in the minds of those who caused Hascall's 
(and Burnside's) policy to be overturned. Governor Morton, the chief insti- 
gator in removing Hascall, never complained of military restrictions on the 
Democratic press in his state. Rather, he consistently voiced his displeasure and 
concern about infringements on civil authority by military officers generally. 
When he discussed specific infringements, he cited military arrests of civilians 
in his state. In his most detailed and fullest disquisition on the topic, his letter to 
Lincoln of May 30, Morton noted that General Orders No. 38 violated federal 
law by removing the power to try persons from the federal courts and giving 
it to military commissions. However, he argued, if military authorities were 
to be given powers to arrest civilians, the decision to do so should be made by 
the "highest authority," that is, the president. Morton saw Burnside's policy as 
illegal and "highly inexpedient." Rather, he wrote, leave matters in the hands of 
state authorities. General Halleck's admonition to Burnside ofMay 20, a reac- 
tion to Morton's complaints, similarly ignored specifically addressing the issue 
of the suppression of the press. He simply stressed avoiding conflicts with civil 
authorities. Likewise, Stanton's often-quoted letter dated June I, while pointing 
to Hascall's indiscretions with the Democratic press, meant to illustrate the 
difficulties created when military officers interfered in matters best handled 
by state authorities. His letter was the promised result of Morton's pressure. 
Hascall's and Burnside's policy of suppressing anti-administration utterance 
received wildly popular support among Indiana Republicans, who reveled in 
their partisan adversaries' d i s~omfo r t .~~  Throughout this episode, including 
45. Burnside to Jonathan Sturgis, June 7,1863, Box 8, Burnside Papers. Burnside composed 
two drafts of this letter, one in pencil, and the other in ink. I have quoted both versions. 
46. For examples of Republican support for military action against Democratic newspapers, 
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the Chicago Times case, Lincoln and his administration showed that they were 
more concerned with placating an important political ally than preserving the 
constitutional liberties of citizens. 
Governor Morton clearly was the chief instigator for the removal of Gen- 
eral Hascall and the end of General Orders No. 9 in Indiana. Morton used 
his enormous influence and authority in Washington to convince national 
leaders to control the military authority where it infringed on his ability to 
manage affairs in his state. If we are to explain why Hascall did not "take 
hold" again of the Indiana Democratic press after the May 20 mass meet- 
ing, the governor must be considered the reason. Morton prevailed over i 
the generals. However, he did not succeed in all the conflicts he had with 
Burnside. Burnside continued to refuse to reinstate General Carrington as 
district commander in Indiana, although he allowed Carrington to return 
to wrap up his business there and eventually allowed him to remain in a 
lesser ~apacity.~' Moreover, Morton failed to keep the number of troops he 
desired in Indiana. Hascall and his successor, Willcox, managed to transport 
reinforcements to Rosecrans's and Grant's armies much to the governor's 
chagrin.48 Finally, while he knew he would not get Carrington back in 
command, Morton tried unsuccessfully to remove Willcox shortly after his 
arrival in Indianapolis and replace him with another general with whom he 
could cooperate closely. Burnside retained Willcox in Indianapolis until the 
beginning of the east Tennessee campaign in September 1863.49 
We would be making Morton a hypocrite ifwe were to paint a portrait of 
him as a champion of press freedom. The governor was no paragon of civil 
see letter of "J .H.P."~~ New Castle Courier, May 14,1863; Lafayette Daily lournal, May 25,1863; 
Marshall County Republican, May 21 and June 11, 1863. Many Republican newspapers and 
speakers voiced similar sentiments prior to Burnside's and Hascall's appointments. See Kokomo 
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1863; Steuben Republican, Mar. 7,1863. This evidence contradicts assertions by some historians 
that bipartisan consensus existed in protest of military repression. See Donna Lee Dickerson, 
The Course of Tolerance: Freedom of the Press in Nineteenth-Century America (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood, iggo), 179, and Curtis, Free Speech, "The People's Darling Privilege," 6,316. 
47. See Col. W. P. Anderson to Carrington, May 7,1863, Burnside to  Carrington, May 16, 
1863, and Salmon P. Chase to Carrington, June 1,1863, all in box 1, folder 16, Carrington Papers. 
See also Hascall to Burnside, May 14,1863, box 7, Burnside Papers; Burnside to Hascall, May 
16,1863, Letterbook number 2, Burnside Collection. 
48. See Laz Noble to Burnside, June 2,1863, Stanton to Burnside, June 7,1863, and four tele- 
grams of Willcox to Burnside, dated June 12,13,16, and 17,1863, all in box 8, Burnside Papers. 
49. W. R. Holloway to Morton, June 18,1863, OPMTC, vol. 11, 62, Indiana State Archives. 
See Robert Garth Scott, ed., Forgotten Valor: The Memoirs, Journals, and Civil War Letters of 
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liberties. In the course of the Civil War, Morton advocated or affected the 
arrest ofDemocratic editors and public speakers, and the suppression of op- 
position newspapers. He did so when it suited his purposes or needs.50 In this 
case, Morton understood clearly that Hascall's policy of military suppression 
of the Democratic press in Indiana not only failed in its aim of bringing the 
opposition under control, but it energized the antiwar Democrats in their 
fight against what they considered to be government tyranny. Morton's 
success in ending that policy was merely a by-product of his larger power 
struggle with federal military authorities to control affairs in Indiana. 
50. See Morton's speech of Apr. 11,1863, quoted in William M. French, Life, Speeches, State 
Papers andPublicServices of Governor Oliver I? Morton (Indianapolis: 1877), 362. See also W. R. 
Holloway to John Hanna, Aug. 15,1862, John Hanna Papers, Lilly Library, Indiana University, 
Bloomington. For Morton's responsibility for the arrest of Indianapolis Daily State Sentinel 
editor J.  J. Binghani in 1864, see Klement, Dark Lanterns, 176. 
